Recent Developments: Ellison v. Maryland: Convicted and Sentenced Criminal Defendant When Called as Non-Party Witness May Invoke Privilege against Self-Incrimination by Sunday, Steven E.
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 18
Number 2 Winter, 1988 Article 13
1988
Recent Developments: Ellison v. Maryland:
Convicted and Sentenced Criminal Defendant
When Called as Non-Party Witness May Invoke
Privilege against Self-Incrimination
Steven E. Sunday
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sunday, Steven E. (1988) "Recent Developments: Ellison v. Maryland: Convicted and Sentenced Criminal Defendant When Called as
Non-Party Witness May Invoke Privilege against Self-Incrimination," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 18 : No. 2 , Article 13.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol18/iss2/13
tion to the Court of Appeals of Maryland: 
"Under an automobile insurance policy 
covering Maryland insureds, is a provision 
in that policy requiring physical contact 
between the insureds' vehicle and the 
phantom vehicle lawful and enforceable 
under Maryland law where the accident 
occurs outside the State of Maryland?" Lee 
v. Wheeler, 810 F.2d 303, 304 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
In answering "no" to the question, 
Judge Adkins reviewed the principle in 
State Farm and expanded it to encompass 
accidents happening outside Maryland 
involving Maryland insureds. 
In State Farm, the Maryland Automobile 
Insurance Fund (MAIF) sought a declara-
tion that an insurance policy requiring, as 
a prerequisite to coverage, physical contact 
between an insured's vehicle and a phan-
tom vehicle violated the uninsured motor-
ist provision of Md. Ann. Code art. 48A, 
§ 541(c) (1957, 1986 Repl. Vol.) which 
mandates that "[i]n no case shall the unin-
sured motorist coverage be less than the 
coverage afforded a qualified person under 
Md. Ann. Code art. 48A §§ 243H and 243-
1." Id. at 237, 528 A.2d at 914. 
Section 243H(a)(1) allows claims for the 
death of or personal injury to qualified 
persons "arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in 
this State where the identity of the motor 
vehicle and of the operator and owner 
thereof cannot be ascertained .... " Claims 
against MAIF are authorized without any 
distinction between impact and non-
impact phantom drivers. State Fann, 227 
Md. at 604,356 A.2d at 562. 
Pennsylvania General argued that, due 
to the "in this state" language, "§ 541(c) 
contains an implied territorial limitation 
when read in harmony with § 
243H(aX1)." 310 Md. at 238, 528 A.2d at 
915. 
The court explained that "[t]he primary 
purpose of the § 541(a) uninsured motorist 
coverage requirement is to assure financial 
compensation to the innocent victims of 
motor vehicle accidents who are unable to 
recover from financially irresponsible 
uninsured motorists." 310 Md. at 238,528 
A.2d at 915 (quoting Pennsylvania Nat'l 
Mut. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 157, 416 
A.2d 734, 737 (1980)). 
Hesitant to imply exclusions or recog-
nize exclusions beyond those expressly 
enumerated by the legislature, the court 
observed that no territorial exclusion or 
limitation is evident within the two 
express exclusions from mandatory mini-
mum uninsured motorist coverage found 
in § 541(cX2). Furthermore, the language 
on which Pennsylvania General relied 
deals with claims against MAIF rather than 
with mandatory motor vehicle liability 
insurance. Due to the legislative history of 
the sections, there is 
a functional continuity of purpose in 
the present MAIF provisions that mili-
tate against reading § 243H as in any 
way qualifying § 541(c)(2) .... The 
provision for compulsory automobile 
insurance, plus the creation of MAIF 
as a liability insurer of last resort, dem-
onstrate the dramatic change in state 
policy with respect to protection of 
the public from the economic harm 
produced by automobile accidents. 
310 Md. at 240, 528 A.2d at 916. 
Judge Adkins went on to say that "[t]o 
insert exclusions by implication or recog-
nize exclusions not expressly prohibited 
by the statute has the dangerous potential 
of seriously frustrating the policies behind 
compulsory automobile liability insur-
ance." Id. at 242,528 A.2d at 917. To allow 
such exclusions "would fly in the face of 
the broadly-protective public policy" 
established through recent case law. Id. at 
243, 528 A.2d at 917. 
The court declined to express an opinion 
on whether Maryland law prohibits a 
physical contact requirement in uninsured 
motorist coverage in commercial policies 
as opposed to personal policies. 310 Md. at 
235-36 n. 1, 528 A.2d at 913. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
expanded the principle of State Farm by 
finding an uninsured motorist provision, 
limiting coverage to situations in which 
there is physical contact between the 
insureds' vehicle and the phantom vehicle, 
unenforceable against public policy under 
Maryland law even when the collision 
occurs outside the State of Maryland. By 
upholding the primary purpose of the 
uninsured motorist coverage requirement, 
this ruling assures financial compensation 
to the innocent victims of motor vehicle 
accidents who are unable to recover from 
financially irresponsible uninsured motor-
ists. 
-Glen P. Smith 
Ellison v. Maryland: CONVICTED 
AND SENTENCED CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANT WHEN CALLED AS 
NON-PARTY WITNESS MAY 
INVOKE PRIVILEGE AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION 
In Ellison v. Maryland, 310 Md. 244, 528 
A.2d 1271 (1987), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that one who has been con-
victed and sentenced in a criminal proceed-
ing may invoke the fifth amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination when 
called to testify as a non-party witness in a 
subsequent proceeding provided that the 
thirty-day time limit for taking an appeal 
or requesting a sentence review has not 
expired. The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland had similarly held the privilege 
applicable but had based their decision on 
a rationale which the court of appeals 
found to be unsupported by precedent. 
Clinton Ellison and Tyrone Little, 
inmates at the Maryland Penitentiary, 
were charged in the Circuit Court for Bal-
timore City with the robbery and first 
degree murder of fellow inmate Charles 
Sneed. Additionally, Ellison and Little 
were charged with lesser included substan-
tive offenses and the state filed notices of 
intent to seek the death penalty. 
The defendants were tried separately, 
with the first case against Little. After clos-
ing arguments, but before a jury verdict 
was returned, the state and Little entered 
into a plea agreement. Little agreed to 
plead guilty to second degree murder in 
return for the state's promise to nol pros 
the first degree murder charge as well as 
the robbery and lesser charges. The state 
also agreed to recommend a twenty-five 
year jail sentence to be served concurrent-
ly with Little's prior sentence. The agree-
ment was carried out as proposed and 
Little was sentenced on June 18, 1984. At 
that time the trial court advised Little that 
he had thirty days in which to request 
either an appeal of his conviction to the 
court of special appeals or a review of his 
sentence by a three judge panel of the cir-
cuit court. 
Ellison's trial began on June 25, 1984, 
seven days after Little had been sentenced. 
During the course of the trial, and before 
Little's thirty-day period in which to 
request an appeal or sentence review had 
expired, Little was called by Ellison to tes-
tify as a witness for the defense. Little 
invoked the fifth amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination and refused to 
testify. The trial court upheld Little's 
invoking of the privilege and Ellison was 
subsequently found guilty of first degree 
murder and robbery. He was sentenced to 
life imprisonment for the murder and 
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received a consecutive ten year sentence 
for the robbery. 
Ellison took his appeal of right to the 
court of special appeals on two grounds. 
He firSt argued that Little's claim of the 
privilege against self-incrimination should 
have been rejected because he had already 
been convicted and sentenced on the mur-
der charge and the state had nol prossed 
the robbery and lesser offenses. In opposi-
tion, the state argued that under the court 
of appeals decision in Smith v. State, 283 
Md. 187,388 A.2d 539 (1978), eert. denied, 
439 U.S. 1130 (1979), Little's claim of priv-
ilege was justified because of the potential 
for reversal on appeal followed by a new 
trial on the same charges. 
The court of special appeals stated that 
the issue was "[a]t what point on the con-
tinuum is the process of incrimination suf-
ficiently complete that the risk of 
incrimination is relegated to the past 
tense?" Ellison v. State, 65 Md. App. 321, 
329, 500 A.2d 650, 654 (1985). The court 
ultimately held that "the risk of incrimina-
tion terminates at the moment the sen-
tence is pronounced." Id. at 338, 500 A.2d 
at 658. In its analysis, the court reasoned 
that testimonial privileges are disfavored 
and in a close case the court should lean 
toward rejecting the privilege. Id. at 327, 
500 A.2d at 653. The court of special 
appeals further reasoned that sentencing is 
the "logical termination point" beyond 
which the privilege may not be used 
because the potential for future sanctions 
then becomes a "mere remote possibility" 
which is "beyond the contemplated pale 
of the constitutional privilege." Id. at 344, 
500 A.2d at 661-62. 
Despite the facially logical analysis 
posited by the court of special appeals, the 
court of appeals nonetheless found it 
unpersuasive. The court of appeals instead 
accepted the position that the state argued, 
that under Smith v. State, Little was enti-
tled to claim the privilege because of the 
potential for reversal on appeal followed 
by a new trial on the same charges. 
In Smith, like the present case, two 
Defendants were arrested together but 
tried separately. One Defendant, Mont-
gomery, entered into a plea bargain with 
the State and was convicted. Before sen-
tencing he was called to testify as a witness 
at the trial of the other Defendant, Smith. 
Montgomery invoked the privilege against 
self-incrimination and the trial court sus-
tained his requeSt. The court of special 
appeals affirmed the trial court, relying on 
language in McClain v. State, 10 Md. App. 
106, 268 A.2d 572, eert. denied, 259 Md. 
733 (1970), where it was held that a witness 
may invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination where "the criminal action 
against him is still pending, as where an 
appeal is outstanding." Id. at 114,268 A.2d 
at 576. The court of special appeals 10 
Smith agreed with the lower court and 
held that while "the general rule [is] that 
the privilege against self-incrimination 
with respect to particular charges is not 
available to a witness whose prosecution 
on those charges has terminated by a guilty 
verdict and sentence," Smith, 283 Md. at 
190,388 A.2d at 540 (citing United States v. 
Gernie, 252 F .2d 664, 670 (2d Cir.), eert. 
denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958», "a witness 
whose time for appeal had not expired was 
deemed to fall within an exception to the 
general rule" and was therefore entitled to 
invoke the privilege. Ellison, 310 Md. at 
251, 528 A.2d at 1274 (1987); see Mills v. 
United States, 281 F.2d 736, 741 (4th Cir. 
1960) (distinguishing Gernie). 
In response to the court of special 
appeals' continuum theory, the court of 
appeals again referred to Smith where it 
was held that it was "not necessary that 
the testimony will with certainty lead to 
further criminal conviction. Rather, there 
must only be a 'reasonable cause to appre-
hend danger.'" Smith, 283 Md. at 193,388 
A.2d at 542 (quoting Hoffman 'V. United 
States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951». Addition-
ally, the court of appeals stated that "a 
criminal defendant's chance of overturn-
ing a verdict or sentence on appeal certain-
ly does not fall into the category of a mere 
remote possibility." Ellison, 310 Md. at 
257, 528 A.2d at 1277 (1987). The court 
noted that of thirty-two recent criminal 
appeals in Maryland only fifteen were 
affirmed in their entirety, while six had 
verdicts affirmed but sentences vacated; 
three had verdicts affirmed in part and 
reversed in part; and eight resulted in judg-
ments being reversed or vacated. Id. at 258, 
528 A.2d at 1277-78. Also, defendants seek-
ing a sentence review run the risk that 
their sentence could be increased as a result 
of information which may come to light if 
they are compelled to testify. 
Thus, it was apparent to the court of 
appeals that until the thirty-day time limit 
for filing an appeal or requesting a review 
of sentence had expired, Little was entitled 
to invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination in the state's proceedings 
against Ellison. 
Ellison's second ground for appeal was 
that the lower court erred in accepting the 
state's position that Little was entitled to 
invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination because his testiniony might 
lead the state to charge him with addition-
al crimes, such as conspiracy to commit 
murder. Conversely, it was Ellison's con-
tention that Little's position was unfound-
ed because the state would be precluded 
from bringing additional charges by the 
prior plea bargain or by principles of dou-
ble Jeopardy. The court of special appeals 
accepted the state's position, however the 
court of appeals declined review of that 
argument in light of its determinative 
holding on Ellison's first ground for 
appeal. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has 
thus held in this case that, until the thirty-
day time period for taking an appeal or 
requesting a sentence review has expired, 
the very real possibility of reversal on 
appeal or imposition of an augmented jail 
term is sufficient to justify a non-party 
witness' use of the fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 
-Steven E. Sunday 
Go ahead. Uve it up while you can. 
Eat anything and everything 
you want, from those processed 
meats to fatty dairy products 
to that extra measure of salt. But 
do it soon. Because poor eat-
ing habits can lead to high blood 
cholesterol, which can result 
in clogged arteries, a damaged 
heart, and an early death. The 
American Heart Association urges 
you to eat sensibly. Avoid food 
high in fat, salt and cholesterol. 
AvOid eating too much. It could 
keep you from an early grave and 
let you live it up a little longer. 
~aAmeriCan Heart 
V' Association 
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